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235 ABSTRACT
36 Face recognition is an apparently straightforward but, in fact, complex ability, encompassing 
37 the activation of at least visual and somatosensory representations. Understanding how identity 
38 shapes the interplay between these face-related affordances could clarify the mechanisms of self-
39 other discrimination. To this aim, we exploited the so-called “face inversion effect” (FIE), a specific 
40 bias in the mental rotation of face images (of other people): with respect to inanimate objects, face 
41 images require longer time to be mentally rotated from the upside-down. Via the FIE, which 
42 suggests the activation of somatosensory mechanisms, we assessed identity-related changes in the 
43 interplay between visual and somatosensory affordances between self- and other-face 
44 representations. Methodologically, to avoid the potential interference of the somatosensory 
45 feedback associated with musculoskeletal movements, we introduced the tracking of gaze direction 
46 to record participants’ response. Response times from twenty healthy participants showed the larger 
47 FIE for self- than other-faces, suggesting that the impact of somatosensory affordances on mental 
48 representation of faces varies according to identity. The present study lays the foundations of a 
49 quantifiable method to implicitly assess self-other discrimination, with possible translational 
50 benefits for early diagnosis of face processing disturbances (e.g. prosopagnosia), and for 
51 neurophysiological studies on self-other discrimination in ethological settings.
52
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359 INTRODUCTION
60 Self-other discrimination for faces is not limited to only visual perception. In fact it is 
61 influenced also by other perceptual modalities, including somatosensation [1]. Thus, by comparing 
62 visual and somatosensory percepts (as well as motor) with internal representations of self and other 
63 faces, we become able to recognize ourselves in a mirror and distinguish our face from another 
64 person’s one. At the representational level, the specificity of the relative weight between visual and 
65 somatosensory aspects of mental representations of faces is highlighted by the so-called “face 
66 inversion effect” (FIE). According to the FIE, upside-down images of faces are more difficult (and 
67 slower) to be mentally rotated to upright, with respect to images of inanimate objects [2]. On this 
68 basis, the FIE can be mechanistically considered a sign of a heavier weight of somatosensory (than 
69 visual) components of mental representations, while its absence (as for inanimate objects) suggests 
70 the activation of mainly visuo-spatial processing [3]. This difference would put the fundaments for 
71 a semantic distinction between mental representations of faces versus inanimate objects. 
72 In the same vein, faces and inanimate objects might be only two entries of a continuum along 
73 which progressively more salient somatosensory affordances are attributed to different items. At 
74 which stage of this continuum does the FIE appear? Does it differentially affect images of faces 
75 with similar pictorial configuration but different details? Can identity-related distinctions be 
76 sufficient to trigger differences in the FIE? To answer these questions, it can be hypothesized that 
77 mainly visual affordances might be attributed to inanimate objects (more different with respect to 
78 the human body) and mainly somatosensory affordances might characterize the mental 
79 representation of faces (more similar to the human body). Thus, as the relative weight of visual and 
80 somato-vestibular affordances might change according to the characteristics of the entry within the 
81 continuum, we predicted that the more the entry is similar to oneself, the larger the impact of 
82 somatosensory affordances. 
83 As the somatosensory impact can be accessed through the FIE, the magnitude of the FIE itself 
84 for different entries can be considered an objective measure of implicit self-other discrimination. 
85 For these reasons, in the present study we manipulated the identity of images of faces and measured 
86 the FIE in healthy participants. In particular, healthy participants indicated which eye (left, right) 
87 was covered by a black patch (mental rotation) in series of different face images (self, other) 
88 presented in four orientations (0°, 90°, 180°, 270°). 
89
90 MATERIAL AND METHODS
91 Participants – Twenty participants (male; mean age = 24.2 y.o. SD = 6.27) had at least an 
92 undergraduate education, were right-handed[4], and had normal vision and no neurological disease. 
493 The local Ethics Committee approved the study and participants read and signed an informed 
94 consent form prior the experiment, which was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of 
95 Helsinki 1964.
96
97 Stimuli and setup – Participants sat on a chair in front of a computer screen. They were 
98 presented with images of faces, one at a time, covering a visual angle of about 13° at a distance of 
99 60 cm (Figure 1A). Each image represented a real face without hair and ears. To manipulate 
100 identity, the images could represent either the participant himself (self-face), or a complete stranger 
101 (other-face). To exclude the potential influence of familiarity, the other-face image was an avatar 
102 image and was the same for all the participants. Images appeared centered on the computer screen, 
103 once at time, aligned straight in front of the participant, in one of four orientations (upright=0°, 90°, 
104 180°, 270°). On each image, one eye was covered by a black patch (Figure 1A). The luminance of 
105 the difference images was equalized using an automated in-house software. The spatial features 
106 were equalized by programming that the tip of the nose of each image will be aligned with the 
107 centre of the screen. 
108
109 Procedure –To show that implicit self-other discrimination is associated with a change in the 
110 relative weight of visual and somatosensory affordances of mental representation of faces, we 
111 recorded response times and accuracy while participants performed mental rotation of self- and 
112 other-face images. According to the mental rotation procedure [3], for each image, participants were 
113 asked to identify which eye was covered by the black patch (left or right). As the main question 
114 regarded implicit self-other discrimination, participants were not asked to explicitly recognize the 
115 identity of the presented images. The experimental session consisted of two runs, counterbalanced 
116 across participants. Each runs contained 48 images belonging to one identity (self, other). Each 
117 image was repeated three times at a given orientation, with the same image never presented twice in 
118 sequence [5]. Each trial began with a fixation cross in the centre of the computer screen followed by 
119 an image 1000ms later. Each image remained visible until a response was given [6]. Participants’ 
120 gaze was continuously monitored and tracked (Eyelink 1000 eyetracking system). To avoid any 121 
possible influence of musculoskeletal movements and the associated proprioceptive changes on the 122 
task, participants indicated their responses by placing their gaze (staring at) to specific regions of 123 
the screen, i.e. they responded by staring at the regions marked as response “buttons” (frames 124 
including the words “left” or “right”). These “buttons” were positioned above and below the target 125 
image, in counterbalanced order across participants (Figure 1). The eye-tracking system recognized 126 
where on the screen the participants were staring and, when they stared at one of the two “buttons”, 
5127 it encoded their responses as “left” or “right”, accordingly. Therefore, RTs were defined as the time 
128 between the image onset and the stable positioning of the participant’s gaze in one of the two 
129 “buttons”.
130
131 Data Preprocessing – Trials with RTs <500ms or >3500ms and incorrect trials were excluded 
132 from analysis [7-11], with a total loss of 8.6%. The RTs of the remaining (correct) trials were 
133 analyzed by means of a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), with identity (self-face, 
134 other-face), laterality (left-eye, right-eye), and orientation (0°, 90°, 180°, 270°) as within-subject 
135 factors. Post-hoc analyses were carried out using the Newman-Keuls test (p<0.05).
136
137 RESULTS
138 The analysis of variance (ANOVA) for response times (RTs) of correct responses, with identity 
139 (self-face, other-face), laterality (left-eye, right-eye), and orientation (0°, 90°, 180°, 270°) as main 
140 factors, showed the significant interaction between identity and orientation [F(3,57)=7.021; 
141 p<0.01]. Thus the FIE (RTs difference between images presented at 180° and 0°) was larger for 142 
self-face (418.1ms) than other-face (183.3ms) images (Figure 1B). These differences between self- 143 
and other-face cannot be the result of image familiarity, as no main effect of identity was observed 144 
[F(1,19)=1.133; p=0.301]. 
145 ----------------------------------------------------------------------
146 Please insert Figure 1 about here
147 ----------------------------------------------------------------------
148 The origin of the larger FIE for self-face images was explicated by the significant interaction 
149 between identity and orientation [F(3,57)=7.021; p<0.01]. The post-hoc comparisons of this 
150 interaction showed that for both self- and other-face images RTs increase from 0° (1041.7 and 151 
1164.1 ms, respectively) to 180° (1459.8 ms and 1329.7 ms, respectively) (all p<0.01) (Figure 1C). 152 
These data suggest that the typical increase of RTs as a function of orientation was present for both 153 
kinds of images. The direct comparison between self and other-face images presented at the same 154 
orientation showed that at 0° the RTs for self-face (1041.7 ms) were significantly faster than other- 155 
face (1164.1 ms). By contrast, at 180° RTs for self-face (1459.8 ms) were significantly slower than 156 
other-face images (1329.7 ms) (all p<0.05). This supports that the FIE (RTs difference between 157 
images presented at 0° and 180°) was larger for self- that other-face images. 
158 Other significant effects generally confirmed previous studies on mental rotation [12-15]. In 
159 particular, there was a significant interaction between Laterality and Orientation [F(3;57)=7.956; 
160 p<0.01], explained by images presented at 180°, where the responses for left-lateralized images 
6161 (1463.6 ms) was slower than right-lateralized images (1325.8 ms; p<0.05). Conversely, for images 
162 presented at 270°, responses for left-lateralized images (1050.5 ms) were faster than for right-
163 lateralized images (1192.7 ms; p<0.05). In addition, for other-face images, only the RTs for images 
164 presented at 180° were significantly slower with respect to all the other orientations (all p<0.05). No 
165 significant identity- related differences were found for the 90° and 270° orientations, suggesting 
166 that only in the more common view (0°) and the most difficult view (180°) the representations of 
167 self- and other-face were differentially processed. 
168
169 DISCUSSION
170 In the present study we used the FIE as a quantitative method to assess implicit self-other 
171 discrimination for face images, based on the impact of somatosensory affordances onto mental 
172 representations of face. Our data provide evidence that implicit self-other discrimination is 
173 dependent not only on vision, but also on the changeable weight of constant somatosensation on 
174 face representation. Via the FIE we assessed that identity-related processing affects this relative 
175 weight of somatosensory affordances, in that it is greater for mental representation of self than other 
176 faces. 
177
178 Visuo-Somatosensory interplay for self-other discrimination
179 In normal conditions, people are faster to recognize their own face with respect to strangers’ 
180 [16, 17] and family members’ faces [18], even if faces are upside-down [19]. Extending this 181 
evidence, the present study shows that, not only visual perception, but also mental representation of 182 
faces is affected by identity. The larger FIE for self-face images suggests that face-related 183 
somatosensory affordances have a greater weight on mental representation of self- than other-face. 184 
Such effect is considered a sign that the current body configuration is used as a frame of reference 185 
[3] and that physical constraints shape the mental representation of the body within this frame [20]. 186 
On this basis, we propose that the major role of somatosensory components could be emerging from 187 
the biomechanical constraints of the neck and head, leading to a specific impact on mental 188 
representation of self-face.
189 Combining visual and somatosensory input, we create a mental representation of our face, we 
190 identify it as belonging to ourselves, and we mentally process it in a different way with respect to 
191 another person’s. Face-related multisensory inputs are usually matched in daily experience of self-
192 face (grooming, shaving, applying make-up, etc.). Conversely, in the present study, the mismatch 
193 between the participants’ face somatosensation (upright) and the presented face image (upside-
194 down), may have disturbed more strongly the mental processing of self-face (than other-face), 
7195 leading to the observed larger FIE. Considering that FIE is absent in young children [21], it is likely 
196 that the ability to distinguish identity is a learned process based on visual experience of faces. In 
197 this vein, as we are used to see (vision) and feel (somatosensation) our own face mainly upright, it 
198 is plausible that the larger FIE is due to a more crystallized (upright) representation of self-face, as 
199 the result of generally lacking experience in other orientations. 
200 Where does the FIE come from? A larger orientation-dependent bias (difference between 
201 upright versus upside-down images) for self-faces than other-faces has been repeatedly reported 
202 both at the behavioral [17, 19] and the brain level [22-24]. This identity-and-orientation effect is 
203 largely depending on the visual characteristics of the images because, for instance, it is absent in 
204 case of stretched faces [16]. Not only does upside-down inversion affect more self- than other-
205 faces’ processing, but also it suggests that upright and upside-down orientations could be only two 
206 extremes of a continuum. Accordingly, previous work reported that RTs progressively increase as a 
207 function of the angular disparity between the presented face image and the upright position [3, 25]. 
208 The present data are in line with this previous evidence, confirming the influence of orientation of 
209 mental processing of faces, and further extend previous results by showing that this influence is 
210 even larger for self- than other-faces. 
211
212  Self- vs. other-face cognitive processing
213 Typically, self-other discrimination for faces is accomplished through (i) a comparison of the 
214 seen face with an average face representation, using the deviance from the average to attribute 
215 identity [26], or (ii) a holistic recognition based on configurational representation process, where 
216 parts of the face are analyzed and gathered independently [27]. In this perspective, we propose that 
217 self-face representation is treated as a holistic recognition process, including not only visual aspects, 
218 but also somatosensory ones. Conversely, as other-face representation depends less on 
219 somatosensation, it could be treated according to a comparison process. On this basis, we propose 
220 that we use internal holistic representations of our own face as a frame of reference to mentally 
221 transform and recognize self-face images.
222 The differentiation between self- and other-face mental representations is in line with the 
223 importance of and the distinction between “effector-based” versus “perspective” mental spatial 
224 transformations [28]. With respect to a fixed environment, effector-based transformations change 
225 the effector’s coordinates (e.g. body parts), while perspective transformations change the 
226 participant’s point of view. Thus, effector-based transformations would rely more on somatosensory 
227 representations, while perspective transformations would activate more visuo-spatial 
228 representations. In the present study, the larger FIE for self-face suggests the involvement of 
8229 effector-based transformations, relying on somatosensory mechanisms. The smaller FIE for other-
230 face suggests the prioritization of perspective transformations relying on visuo-spatial 
231 representations. We propose that the FIE is larger for self-face processing because the contrast 
232 between the actual somatosensory (upright) and visual input (upside-down) has a greater weight on 
233 the mental representations of self-face than other-face.
234
235  Perspectives and Applications
236 The ability to attribute perceptions and actions to oneself or someone else is an index of self-
237 consciousness across living species, from birds to humans [29]. Testing such self-other 
238 discrimination typically involves the mirror test: marking the subject’s face and then presenting the 
239 subject with a mirror [30, 31]. Although most self-aware species will probe this mark, many 
240 implementations of the mirror test have produced controversial data, including important limitations 
241 associated with cultural background, methodological procedures, and data interpretation [32]. Here, 
242 we introduce a novel index of implicit self-other discrimination in humans that capitalizes on the 
243 known FIE. As a sign of the involvement of somatosensory components in the mental 
244 representations of faces, the FIE entails longer behavioral responses to inverted than upright faces 
245 (of others) that is diminished, if not absent, for inanimate objects [2]. Here, we show that the FIE is 
246 more than doubled when viewing one’s own face than another’s. 
247 These data provide a quantifiable test of the integrity of implicit self-other discrimination that 
248 can be applied in clinical and neuroethological settings alike. Considering the ease of the 
249 experimental procedures used here, the self-other discrimination method we introduce here can 
250 have important translational benefits. The implementation of the present setup and task in clinical 
251 and experimental environments can produce relevant advances for e.g. early diagnosis of clinical 
252 conditions affecting face processing (e.g. prosopagnosia) [33] or sensorimotor control (e.g. spinal 
253 cord injury) [15], as well as for neurophysiological research on self-representation in animal models 
254 [34] and the development of biomedical engineering solution for patients with reduced or absent 
255 mobility [35, 36]. On this basis, future studies will be required to identify the neurophysiological 
256 counterparts and brain activation patterns encoding such self-other discrimination at the 
257 representational level. 
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356 FIGURE CAPTION
357 Figure 1 – A) Illustration of the experimental setup. The self- and other-face realistic images 
358 (represented here by an avatar face) were presented on a computer screen between two frames 
359 comprising the writings “left” and “right” (“response buttons”). An eye-tracking system positioned 
360 below the screen, detected where participants were looking during the whole experiment. 361 
Participants provided responses by staring at one of the two “buttons”. B) Face Inversion Effect. 362 
The RTs difference between images presented at 180° and 0° was larger for self-face (grey) than 363 
other-face images (black). Error bars represent the confidence interval. The asterisk represents 364 
statistically significant difference. C) Kinesthetic aspects of face representation. Images’ 365 
orientation had a larger impact on participants’ performance (modulation of RTs) with self-face 366 
(grey-full line) than other-face images (black-dash line). Error bars represent the confidence 367 
interval. Asterisks represent significant differences between self- and other-faces, for each 368 
orientation.

